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DIVIDEND RULES AND MISTAKEN PRECEDENT
JAMES JOSEPH FARLOW*
I
Early in corporate history a board of directors assembled
in a properly called meeting had authority to declare divi-
dends according to their discretion, and payment was subse-
quently made at the pleasure of the corporate officials.
This method of division of profits is employed today by
smaller businesses and closed corporations which do not
depend upon the systematized markets such as the New
York Stock Exchange for capital. But another method
has become necessary because of the mass issues of se-
curities on the market today. Millions of dollars are in-
vested and shares may be thinly spread among thousands of
investors. Vast numbers of shares may be outstanding.
Thus dividends must be paid to many thousands of investors.
Because of daily transfers of shares some date must be set
whereby holders of record on a particular date will be en-
titled to receive payment. Only by some definite and open
announcement can traders value their shares and sell on the
market without confusion.
Were it not for this practice, directors and corporate
officers could, because of knowledge gained through their
offices, buy stock, declare dividends, and sell the following
day such shares to investors who would not be aware of what
was happening. Dividends would then be paid to the di-
rector or other party who held the stock; and, thus, through
the manipulation a handsome profit would result. Hence,
there was the origination of what will for convenience be
known in this paper as the three-date-system where a resolu-
tion is passed by directors on one date, to pay holders of
record on an intermediate date, payable on a subsequent date.
All corporations do not use the same three dates, but an ex-
ample would be for the directors to declare a dividend on
the 1st of December payable to holders of record on the 15th
of December and payable on the 31st.
* L.L.B. Indiana University (1942), now in Armed Forces of the United
States.
(111)
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The New York Stock Exchange has its own regulations.1
When a dividend is declared it requires that the stock be
quoted "dividend on" which means that there has been a divi-
dend declared and is represented in the market quotation.
After the intermediate date the amount of dividend to be paid
is subtracted from the quotation price of the stock and the "ex-
dividend" mark is inserted by such stock quotation showing
that the amount of the dividend has been subtracted from
the quotation.
Two situations will be discussed in this paper. The
first involves the application of the general rule for vesting
of dividends under the original system; the second involves
a split of authority where the three-date-system is used.
McLaren v. The Crescent Planing Mill Company3 is
perhaps the leading decision on vesting of dividends under
the original method. The case holds that upon the declara-
tion of a dividend: First, a debtor-creditor relationship is
created between corporation and each stockholder for the
amount of the dividend, to which he is entitled; second, that
it is not necessary that directors set a fund aside for pay-
ment;4 but, if they do, a trust fund is created giving them
rights superior to those of general creditors; third, that
1. Rules NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, Art. 32. Dividends de-
clared pass with the stock until the time of the closing of the
books. After that stock passes ex-dividend.
Also, NEW YORK STOCK CORPORATION LAW, § 62. "The
board of directors . . . . may fix a day and hour not exceeding
40 days preceding the date fixed for the payment of any dividend
as a record time for the determination of the stockholders
entitled to receive any such dividend . . . .and in such case only
stock holders of record at the time so fixed shall be entitled to
receive such dividend. . . ".
2. See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS (1930) § 160; also
FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (1932), c. 58, § 5380
both recognize that there are two rules for vesting of dividends
where declaration is made on a date to be paid to holders of
record of an intermediate date and payable on a third period.
3. 117 Mo. App. 40, 93 S.W. 819 (1906).
4. While some courts hold that a declaration by the board of directors
is setting aside a sum, others indicate that actual cash should be
set aside. See Rose v. Little Investment Company, 86 F. (2d)
50, 51 (C.C.A. 5th, 1936); Brown v. Luce Mfg. Co., 231 Mo. 259,
96 S.W. (2d) 1098 (1936); Petty v. Hagan, - Ky.- , 265 S.W.
787 (1924); But, cf., Hadly v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 36 F.
(2d) 543 (C.C.A.D.C., 1929); Alsop v. De-Koven, 205 Ill. 309, 68
N.E. 930 (1903); In Re Fielding, 96 Fed. 800 (W.D.Mo. 1899);
Sexton v. C. L. Percival Co., Iowa, 177 N.W. 83 (1920); Cogge-
shall v. Georgia Land & Investment Co., 14 Ga. 667, 82 S.E. 156
(1914).
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once declared the dividend may not be recalled because a
debtor cannot revoke or rescind a debt.
This case is unquestionable authority under the old sys-
tem. Thus we find the law stated in parable by an English
judge years ago: "Dividends declared are likened to fallen
fruit, which does not pass under a sale or gift of the tree.'"'
"WVhile the law permits the seller to retain the fallen fruit,
it does not accord him the additional privilege of shaking
the tree after the bargain is closed." Dividends declared
subsequent to the transfer of ownership therefore belong to
the transferee.6
However a rescission of a dividend was apparently al-
lowed by the courts in Ford v. Easthampton Rubber Thread
Company7 On the day of the annual meeting of stockhold-
ers the directors meeting in an adjacent room passed a reso-
lution for payment of a dividend. It was customary for the
president to then come into the stockholders meeting and
announce the dividend. This was not done and the dividend
voted was not made public. Subsequently on the same day
a new board of directors elected at the stockholders meeting
voted to rescind the dividend. Such vote was upheld by
the courts but because the vote had not been made known
to anyone. The stockholders had made no contract, incurred
no liability, nor made any reliance upon the vote; nor did
the vote constitute a contract of the corporation with its
stockholders; nor had there been a fund set aside which
could be called a trust.
How could a corporation rescind a debt? This has been
justified on the ground that the declaration was not com-
plete. 8 Neither was there a reliance on the declaration by
the directors which would cause a change of position suf-
ficient to compel payment.9
Profits credited to personal accounts of the four stock-
5. DeGendre v. Kent, L. R. 4 Eq. 283 (1865).
6. LaFountain & Woolson Co. v. Brown, 91 Vt. 412, 101 AtI. 37 (1917).
7. 158 Mass. 84, 32 N.E. 1036 (1893).
8. See Hudson v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 99 F. (2d) 630, 635
(C.C.A. 6th, 1938); The Gregg., Ltd., Petitioner v. Commissioner
of Int. Rev., 25 B.T.A. 81, 91 (1932); Eaton Collector v. English
& Mersick Co., 7 F. (2d) 54 (C.C.A. 2d, 1925); Davidson & Case
Lumber Company v. Mattox, 14 F. (2d) 137, 139 (D.C.D. Kan.
1926); A. David Co. v. Grissom, 64 F. (2d) 279, 281, 282 (C.C.A.
4th, 1933); Bulger Block Coal Co. v. U.S., 48 F. (2d) 675 (1931).
9. See note 8 supra.
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holders of a business in proportion to ownership was held
not to be the declaration of a dividend in Eaton, Collector
of Internal Revenue v. English & Mersick Company.10 There
was no formal vote of directors nor payment nor segregation
of a fund known as a dividend. Instead the amount credited
to the personal accounts was invested in machinery, tools
and equipment. In an effort to collect a tax the Government
asserted that there was a dividend and thus the amount re-
tained by the corporation was "borrowed capital" and tax-
able. Defendant's contention that the credits were "invested
capital" was upheld by the court which stated that the only
way the stockholders could reach this surplus was by liquida-
tion of the business. The directors presumably knew the
law and could have declared a dividend by vote of the direc-
tors.
While these decisions probably narrow the law some-
what the general rule still stands that the declaration creates
the debt. What these cases really do is form the law on what
constitutes a declaration, namely: resolution of the directors
to pay on a given date and publication of such fact to the pub-
lic that such dividend will be paid. Hence the courts in later
decisions properly distinguished and explained these two
cases on the theory that there was no declaration of a divi-
dend rather than that a declaration properly declared does not
create a debt. 1
Since the declaration of a dividend creates a debt under
the original system let us look at the effect of such a ruling
upon various factual situations. The owner of stock on the
day of declaration is entitled to receive the dividend. After
declaration, a subsequent transfer of the stock does not pass
the dividend without express or implied agreement so to do.'
2
Intent that the dividend should go with the stock could be
expressly stated in the contract and agreed to be part of the
bargain for which the consideration was given. Or an im-
plied agreement might be shown by custom or past dealings.
10. 7 F. (2d) 54 (C.C.A. 2d 1925).
11. See cases note 7 supra, for general discussion on this point.
If there is a declaration, a subsequent transfer to the Capital
Accounts is held to be borrowed capital thus recognizing a dividend.
If there are acts which do not justify the courts in determining
that there has been a declaration then the proper accounting term
as held by the courts is invested capital.
12. Ford v. Snook, 205 App. Div. 194, 199 N.Y. Supp. 680 (1928).
Affirmed without opinion in 240 N.Y. 624, 148 N.E. 782 (1925).
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Otherwise a transferee after the declaration date is not en-
titled to receive the payment. 8 Likewise a donor has pref-
erence over a donee; also a pledgor over a pledgee;- testator
over legatee; " life tenant over remainderman ;16 assignee of
bankrupt over trustee in building; executor over devisee.
The right being vested it cannot be taken away without con-
sideration or delivery as a gift.
Dividends must be paid from surplus for if there are no
current profits or previously accumulated profits there can
be no dividends.'7 If directors declare a dividend which im-
pairs capital or if at the time the corporation is insolvent,
then a creditor of the corporation may subsequently recover
them from the stockholder.15 This is best rationalized on
the basis that there is no dividend and hence no conflict in
reasoning between the rule that dividends must be returned
and the rule that the corporation cannot rescind a debt. But
when a dividend is fully and lawfully declared, the stock-
holders are in precisely the same position as other creditors.
13. Ibid; Western Securities v. Silver King, 57 Utah 88, 192 Pac. 664(1920); Lunt v. Genesee Valley Trust Co. 162 N.Y. Misc. 859,
297 N.Y. Supp. 27 (1937).
14. Boyd v. Conshohocken Worsted Mills, 149 Pa. 363, 24 Atl. 287
(1892).
15. DeGendre v. Kent, L.R. 4 Eq. 283 (1865); Brundage v. Brundage,
65 Barb. 397 (N.Y. 1869); Nutter v. Andres, 246 Mass. 224, 142
N.E. 67 (1923).
16. In Re Kernochan, 104 N.Y. 618, 11 N.E. 149 (1887); Cf., Talbot
v. Milligan, 221 Mass. 367, 108 N.E. 1060 (1912); In Re Mc-
Keown's Est., 263 Pa. 78, 106 Atl. 189 (1919); In Re Earp's Ap-
peal, 28 Pa. 368 (1857); In Re Smith's Est., 140 Pa. 344, 21 Atl.
438 (1891); Van Dorman v. Olden, 19 N.J. Eq. 176, 97 Am. Dec.
650 (1868); Davis v. Jackson, 152 Mass. 58, 25 N.E. 21 (1890);
But see, Talbot v. Milligan, 221 Mass. 367, 108 N.E. 1060 (1915);
Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101, 96 Am. Dec. 705 (1868); Lamb v.
Lehmann, 110 Ohio St. 59, 143 N.E. 276 (1924).
Under the Pennsylvania rule there is an apportionment of an
extraordinary dividend between life tenant and the remainderman,
according to whether it is declared out of profits earned before
testator's death or afterward. This is the majority American
view. Fletcher, Cyc. Private Corp. (1932) § 3713.
But there is the rule known as the Mass. rule and prevails in
Mass., Conn., Del., Georgia, Ill., Ky., Maine, N. Carolina, and Vt.
which holds that the life tenant shall prevail over the remainder-
man in all events.
Where life tenant dies before dividend is declared even which
apportionment statute is effective there is no question in ordinary
dividends. Fletcher, Cyc. Private Corp. (1932) § 3714.
17. Lexington Life, Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Page, 17 B. Mon. (Ky.)
412, 66 Am. Dec. 165 (1856); Mackall v. Pecock, 136 Minn. 8, 161
N.W. 228 (1917).
18. Lexington Life, Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Page, 17 B. Mon. (Ky.)
412, (1856).
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If insolvency comes before payment, the stockholders share
pro rata with other creditors. "' If a fund has been paid into
a depository for payment of the dividend then such has been
held a trust and stockholders share in preference to cred-
itors.20
In one instance a dividend was made payable at the
pleasure of the company. On the company's failure to pay,
a stockholder brought suit and the court held that a dividend
payable at the pleasure of the company is payable in a rea-
sonable time.21
Stockholders cannot hold directors personally liable for
the dividend.22  Upon the declaration of a dividend there is
only a debtor-creditor relationship between corporation and
stockholders and a trust relationship results only after the
fund has been placed in the bank.
23
With all this in mind the rule can now be better stated
as follows: If there is a declaration of an ordinary cash
dividend at a properly convened meeting of directors de-
clared from surplus2 derived from profits25 and communicat-
ed26 to stockholders, a debtor-creditor relationship is created
between corporation and stockholders.2 7
II
Is the rule that the declaration of a dividend creates a
debtor-creditor relationship between corporation and stock-
holder on the day of declaration the law where the three-
date-system is used? Does it apply, for example, if a divi-
dend is declared on the 1st day of the month, payable on the
30th day of the month to holders of record on the stock
transfer book on the 15th? Does the general rule apply
where shares are transferred between the declaration and
19. Stringer's Case L.R. 4 Ch. App. 475 (1867).
20. LeRoy v. Globe Insurance Co., 2 Edw. Ch. 657 (N.Y., 1836).
21. Billingham v. E. P. Gleason Mfg. Co., 101 App. Div. 476, 91
N.Y. Supp. 1046, 1048 (1905).
22. Ford v. Easthampton Rubber Thread Co., 158 Mass. 84, 82 N.E.
1036 (1893).
23. Ballantine, Corporations (1930) 504.
24. Powers v. Heggie, 268 Mass. 233, 167 N.E. 314 (1929).
25. Hubbard v. Weare, 79 Iowa 678, 44 N.W. 915 (1890).
26. Ford v. Easthampton Rubber Thread Co., 158 Mass. 84, 32 N.E.
1036 (1893).
27. McLaren v. The Crescent Planing Mill Co., 117 Mo. App. 40,
93 S.W. 819 (1906); BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS (1930) 504.
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intermediate date or does the use of "dividend on" and "ex-
dividend" alter the application of the rule ?28 Or can it be
used under such circumstances since there can be no debt
without some one to whom a debt is owed? In the states
having decisions on this question, a majority do not apply the
general rule under any circumstances where there is a trans-
fer of stock between the day of declaration and the day for
determining who shall be the owner of the dividend. 29 Two
jurisdictions, New York and Utah have apparently accepted
it in certain factual situations.
In Ford v. Snook- a New York judge handed down a
decision seemingly unfair to business practices. The owner
of 50 shares of Continental Can turned the stock over to
Syracuse Trust Company and sale was made on the 18th of
March. A dividend had been declared on March 10th to be
paid to owners registered on the stock book March 20. The
record of the transfer was not made until some time after
the 20th and dividend was paid to the seller. The Supreme
Court reversed the lower court stating that there was no evi-
dence to show that defendant knew the Trust Company was a
member of the New York Exchange and that the stock would
be sold according to such custom and the defendant (seller)
was not bound by the rules of the exchange. Thus the
general rule was invoked. The actual holding of the case
was not so erroneous but the language of the court was
copied in later decisions in two states. What the court ac-
tually held was that in the absence of competent evidence
the broker paid the amount of the dividend to the purchaser,
or in absence of evidence that the purchaser assigned the
dividend to the broker, he is not entitled to recover the divi-
dend from the defendant seller. If the dividend did not be-
long to the seller, it belonged to the purchaser of the stock,
not the broker. Such is a holding that any court would fol-
low, but the case contained language saying that the pay-
ment to the registered holder of the stock on the intermediate
date was for the convenience of the corporation and was not
to effect legal title to the dividend. Also, the court said that
when customers trade on the exchange they adopt the rules
28. New York Stock Exchange rules, note 2, supra.
29. California, Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, North Carolina,
and District of Columbia. Contra, New York and Utah.
30. 205 App. Div. 194, 199 N.Y. Supp. 630 (1923). Affni'd without
opinion m 240 N.Y. 622, 148 N.E. 732 (1925).
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of the exchange; and, the fact that one trades with a broker
does not mean that he had knowledge of the peculiar way
of trading. The language is unfortunate because of the in-
terpretation the courts gave to this opinion.
Never the less in 1937 in Lunt v. Genesee Valley-' the
New York court followed the above dicta. A foundry cor-
poration declared a dividend on January 11, 1935 to holders
of record on December 31, 1934. The dividend was paid the
next day, January 12, 1935 to ,defendant, Mrs. Chambers,
who was record holder on December 31, 1934. Declaration
was peculiar here in that holders on a subsequent date were
to receive the dividend. The court said Section 62 of New
York Stock Corporation law protected the corporation in
paying the record holder of the shares and the corporation
was right in so paying her but held that the transferee who
purchased before the declaration date should get the dividend
and not the record holder on December 31, 1934 as was de-
clared by the directors. The court went so far as to say the
corporation was right in paying the dividend to her under
Section 62 but it was not right for her to retain it. She
therefore had to pay over the dividend together with interest
from the date she received it. This decision appears to im-
pose an interest payment by requiring the dividend to be
paid to Mrs. Chambers under the law and require that she
pay interest until the date the vendee gets the money. What
the holding really does is to deny to the corporation the
right to set a date prior to the declaration date in which
holders of record shall be paid a dividend.
Of the leading cases here related only the Utah case,
Western Securities v. Silver King32 actually follows the gen-
eral rule of vesting and that case can be seriously questioned.
Here a pledgee, who between the declaration and interme-
diate dates bought stock which had been previously pledged
to himself, was required to account to the pledgor for the
amount of the dividend. The court said payment to other than
the holder of the stock on the declaration date was a conver-
sion; furthermore a corporation cannot defy the law and
specify that a holder on a future date will get a dividend.
Sympathy here for the pledgor must have swayed the court
in its decision because there was some question as to whether
31. 162 N.Y. Misc. 859, 297 N.Y. Supp. 27 (1937).
82. 57 Utah 88, 192 Pac. 664 (1920).
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the pledgee could have sold to himself and whether he got the
best available price for the stock. The court here followed
Ford v. Snook, and, like the decision in that case, this deci-
sion is somewhat questionable on the ground that it denies
the corporation the right of freedom of contract-the con-
tract being the corporation's promise to pay a dividend in
consideration for the investment in the stock by the stock-
holder. Because of this, the decision is not sound although
it is one of the three leading cases applying the general rule
that the declaration of a dividend creates a debt in the owner
of the stock on the date of declaration even when the. three-
date-system is used.
Hence, if there be a New York-Utah rule, which we
can question, yet hardly deny,33 the holding of the leading
cases fail to establish a very strong argument in favor of it.
The New York-Utah rule then, even when the three-
date-system is used, follows the general rule that a debt is
created on the declaration date.34 Unless the parties know
the custom of the exchange and contract accordingly, the
person who holds the stock on the declaration date is entitled
to the dividend although he did not hold it on the interme-
diate date.35 Ordinarily though, shares are traded on the
exchange and then the holder on the intermediate date gets
the dividend because the trading on the exchange implies an
assignment of such dividend.38 The only variation appears
to be when there is a transfer of the stock other than on
33. Fletcher, Cyc. Private Corporations (1932) § 5380. The general
rule that dividends are payable to the owner of the shares at
the time of the declaration of a dividend does not obtain where
at the time the dividend is declared it is by resolution of declar-
ation made payable to stockholders of record at a future date.
Buchanan v. Nat. Savings & Trust Co., 23 F. (2d) 994 (App.
D.C. 1928).
In New York they hold that the rule is for the convenience of
the corporation in order that they be liable to only one stock-
holder. Ford v. Snook, 205 App. Div. 194, 199 N.Y. Supp. 630 (1923).
Ballantine, Corporations (1930) § 160, p. 520, 521 recognizes both
rules of vesting.
34. Ford v. Snook, 205 App. Div. 194, 199 N.Y. Supp. 630 (1923).
35. Ibid; Western Securities v. Silver King, 57 Utah 88, 192 Pac.
664 (1920); Hopper v. Sage, 112 N.Y. 530, 20 N.E. 350 (1889).
"In spite of the usage of the New York Stock Exchange that
a dividend already declared goes with the stock until the date of
closing of the books, the law is that the dividend becomes the
property of the owners of the stock when declared, no matter
whether payable immediately or at a future time. - A sale of the
stock does not pass it as an incident.
36. Lunt v. Genesee Valley, 162 N.Y. Misc. 859, 297 N.Y. Supp. 27(1937).
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the exchange, such as by death of the owner to life tenant
by will, or pledgor to pledgee by agreement; then the New
York court turns about face and awards to the owner on
the declaration date.
Hence let us look at this Connecticut rule which is at
variance with the general rule.
The Connecticut rule followed in at least five jurisdic-
tions37 California,8 Connecticut,39 Illinois,40 Massachusetts,4 1
North Carolina,42 and District of Columbia,"8 gives the divi-
dend to the owner of the stock on the intermediate date in
all instances.44
Such a rule becomes necessary in the large corporation
for practical reasons. The stockholder on the date set gets
the dividend whether transfer is on the market or by death
of the owner, testator, or otherwise.
45
The leading case supporting this view is Ritchner &
Company v. Light a Connecticut corporation, where an ex-
tra dividend was declared to be paid in part on December
29th and part on January 1st, to holders of record on De-
cember 26th. Defendant sold on December 16, 17, and 19
to plaintiffs but certificates were not transferred to the name
of the plaintiffs until after the intermediate date, December
26th. The corporation paid to defendants. The court said
that the stockholders' share of the dividend vests when de-
clared no matter when assets were accumulated. That di-
rectors have sole authority to declare dividends and their
discretion ordinarily will not be interfered with by the courts
unless they act unreasonably or unjustly. The declaration
of dividends rests in the discretion of the board of directors,
and, if declared, they may fix the amount, time, place, man-
ner and means of payment. This custom is not contrary to
37. Graham, When Do Dividends Vest? (1988) 27 Geo. L. J. 74.
38. Smith v. Taecker, 133 Cal. App. 851; 24 P. (2d) 182 (1933).
39. Ritchner & Co., v. Light, 97 Conn. 364, 116 Atl. 600 (1922).
40. Ford v. Ford Mfg. Co., 222 Ill. App. 76 (1921).
41. Nutter v. Andrews, 246 Mass. 224, 142 N.E. 67 (1923).
42. Burroughs v. North Carolina R.R., 67 N.C. 376, 12 Am. Rep. 611
(1872).
48. Buchanan v. National Savings & Trust Co., 23 F. (2d) 994
(App. D.C. 1928).
44. Ritchner & Co. v. Light, 97 Conn. 364, 116 At. 600 (1922).
45. Smith v. Taecker, 183 Cal. App, 351, 24 P. (2d) 182 (1938);
See Notes 36 to 41 supra.
46. 97 Conn. 364, 116 Atl. 600 (1922).
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public policy nor is it unreasonable. Most important of all,
the general rule that stockholders at the time a dividend is
declared may share therein regardless of when they acquired
their stock, or when the dividends were earned, and though
they are payable at a future date, is inapplicable, where the
directors' resolution specifically declares that the dividends
shall be made to stockholders of record on a future day.
Much can be said for the holding of the Ritchner case
in that the owner of the stock on the intermediate date was
entitled to the dividend although he was not registered on
the transfer record. Such holding shows the corporation
may fix the rights of the parties. It also is good authority
that one does not need to be registered on the intermediate
date in order to recover the dividend.
HI
When dividends are declared to be paid on a future date,
the New York-Utah view so strongly praised by certain
writers may be criticized as not being the law in most of the
states, and as inconsistent, awkward, and not adopted to com-
mercial usage.
The New York view errs first in that there is no debtor-
creditor relationship created when the resolution of the
directors is passed.4 7  Who is the creditor? The second
criticism is that it distinguishes between transfers by sale
on the market and transfers by death of life-tenants.4 Such
is an unworthy distinction and without merit. The record
holder acquires the dividend in the first instance and the
non-record holder in the later case.49 Third, there is no money
owed anyone until the intermediate date; hence, no debt until
that time. The amount is not due until the third date, and
no suit could be maintained until that time. To hold other-
wise would be to maintain that one might bring suit and
compel payment of the dividend before the time when the
directors agreed to make it available. It is a debt but
not until the intermediate date is it final and not until the
third date may suit be maintained. Accounting practices
do not determine when a debt is due. There are many con-
tingencies on corporation books some of which never become
47. Lunt v. Genesee Valley, 162 Misc. 859, 297 N.Y. Supp. 27 (1937).
48. Union v. New Haven, 109 Conn. 268, 146 At. 727 (1929).
49. Ibid.
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payable and are written off the books. Critics of the Connec-
ticut rule are wrong here when they say accountant's placing
an item on the liability side of the balance sheet makes it a
debt. 0 How then can the New York rule comply with such
reasoning? Indeed there can be no debtor-creditor relation-
ship when the creditor is undetermined. A possible excep-
tion might be admitted here in the case of negotiable in-
struments but common stock is not negotiable. A notice
to the corporation that stock was sold would relieve them
from paying the dividend until notice was given who bought
the stock. Fourth, when a dividend is declared between
the first and the intermediate date it is necessdry to imply
a contract or assignment of the dividend to the purchaser.51
In case of controversy such implication depends upon a com-
plaining party's ability to establish facts by a preponderence
of the evidence that the trading party knew of the exchange
rules and intended to use them in the pending transaction.
How can it be said the parties intended an assignment when
directors have said that the holder on a date will get the
dividend and not the one who formerly owned the stock?
Once in court it is difficult to prove that the seller knew of
the custom of trading on the exchange. About the only
proof available in absence of express words is past dealings.
Fifth, requiring that the corporation pay to one person, the
record holder and then that holder shall pay to a former
owner is confusing. Such a rule tends to stir up litiga-
tion. Sixth, an action of debt or assumpsit lies for an
unpaid dividend. An action of debt must be based on a
breach of contract, the violation of a duty, or infringement
of a right.52 There is no breach of contract since the prom-
ise is to pay the record holder and not the holder when the
dividend is declared. There is no violation of a duty because
there is no duty under the promise of the contract except to
the record holder on and after payment date. There is no
infringement of a right until the final date is past without
payment. The holder on the intermediate date has the right
to the dividend53 when paid, but there is no breach until the
passing of the final date. Seventh, the New York rule is a
rule of convenience and does not apply unless both parties
have contracted to be bound by it either expressly or im-
50. Graham, When Do Dividends Vest? (1938) 27 Geo. L. J. 74.
51. 205 App. Div. 194, 199 N.Y. Supp. 630 (1923).
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pliedly.54 Industry and finance demands a rule which will
be consistent and may be applied in every instance. Eighth,
this rule under attack interferes with freedom of contract.
If the directors are not able to determine the amount, time,
place, manner, and means of paying dividends the courts
are unreasonably denying the right to contract. Ninth, the
New York rule disregards conflicts of law and applies its
own law. Such was shown in a sharp criticism of the Con-
necticut rule calling it the minority rule.5 5 The criticism
stated that under the Connecticut rule a court would be
bound to pay the record holder regardless of who the owner
is on that date. Such was not true as shown in Ritchner &
Company v. Light-6 where the court said the owner and not
the record holder was entitled to the dividend sued for. It
was suggested that the Connecticut court would be embar-
rassed in applying the law of the domicil of the Corporation
-its own corporation dividend rules-to a Connecticut cor-
poration and the New York rule to a New York corporation.
A life tenant dying between the declaration and the interme-
diate dates would cause the remainderman to get the dividend
if it was a Connecticut corporation, but the personal repre-
sentatives of the life tenant if it was a New York corpora-
tion.5 7
It is my opinion the application of conflicts rules
are proper and that there is nothing embarrassing about
applying them. If applying conflicts rules is embarrassing,
the critic apparently forgot that such could likewise embar-
rass the New York court in a similar situation. But New
York court's decisions ignore the rule of other states. Is
such not contrary to conflicts of law principles?"S
The really embarrassing situation would be that of the
New York court in trying to apply its own law. A situation
52. Nelson v. Wilson, 81 Mont. 560, 653, 264 Pac. 679, 683 (1928);
People Ex. Rel. Nelson v. Peoples Bank and Trust Co., 268 Ill.
App. 39 (1932); In Re Western States Bldg. Loan Assoc., 50 F.
(2d) 632, 633 (S.D.Calif. 1932).
53. Fletcher, Cyc. Private Corporations (1932) § 6342.
54. Hopper v. Sage, 112 N.Y. 530, 20 N.E. 350 (1889).
55. Graham, When Do Dividends Vest? (1938) 27 Geo. L. J. 74.
56. 97 Conn. 364, 116 Atl. 600 (1922).
57. Union & New Haven Trust Co. v. Watrous, 109 Conn. 268, 146
Atl. 7 (1929).
58. Lunt v. Genessee Valley Trust Co., 162 Misc. 859, 297 N.Y. Supp.
27 (1937).
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might arise which would require the award of the dividend
to two people at the same time. For instance, to the personal
representatives of the life tenant-the life tenant being the
holder of the stock on the date of declaration but dying be-
fore the intermediate date, and to the remainderman's trans-
feree as owner of the stock on the record date. This could
come about by the stock being turned over to the remainder-
man after deceased's death, a sale to a second person, and
sale by the second person on the exchange. Obviously the divi-
dend would be paid to the purchaser on the exchange since
he was registered on the corporation books. The personal
representatives of the life tenant also could claim the divi-
dend because the life tenant owned the stock and sold it
privately before being sold on the exchange. One claimant
would maintain that he sold privately and did not pass the
dividend. The last purchaser could maintain that he bought
on the market and corporation was right in paying to him.59
The New York rule being so unworkable, why do courts
follow it simply because it follows the general rule of vest-
ing? The answer is the old theory of mistaken precedent.
A judge hastily follows the general rule and a line of cases
are built upon it because one court has decided without thor-
oughly reasoning through the situation. The law was in-
tended to be for the use of individuals in settling their claims
to property and securing their personal rights and liberties.
People were. not meant to serve the law. There being no
reason for the general rule to be extended to such circum-
stances, the California or Connecticut rule is the correct rule.
The conclusion is based on decisions of a majority of the
states, upon sound reasoning, and adaptability to practical
circumstances.
IV
The operation of the Connecticut rule provides certainty
and is consistent with business practice. For example:
A corporation declares a dividend on December 1 pay-
able on December 31 to holders of record on December 15.
It is the intent of the corporation to pay their dividends to
whom-so-ever may be registered as owners of shares on
the books on the intermediate date.60 As soon as declared
59. Hypothetical case.
60. Smith v. Taecker et al, 133 Cal. App. 351, 24 P. (2d) 182 (1933).
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and announced to the public the declaration is valued in
the minds of the public and all transactions made from
thence on are effected by the declaration. There are suf-
ficient changes of position that the corporation could not
possibly revoke its dividend because all transactions after
the announcing of the dividend are taken into consideration
when dealing on the market. There is no debt however
created until the intermediate date because there can be no
debt without a creditor ascertained although there may be
one payable in the future. Creditors are at that time de-
termined. No creditor was ascertained before such time
hence there is no right to payment. Where there is a right
there is a remedy and there is no remedy unless there is
breach of contract. There is no breach of contract unless
the date of payment passes without the checks being mailed
to shareholders. Besides aiding the corporation in telling
who to pay61 the public is also aided in valuing their prop-
erty and trading with certainty. Rights to the dividend
would be determined as follows:
TRANSFER OF SHARES
Before Intermediate Date After the Intermediate Date
Donee Donor
Pledgee Pledgor
Transferee Transferor
Remainderman Life tenant's personal
representatives
Assignee of bankrupt Trustee-in-bankruptcy
Devisee Executor
Since other difficulties could be determined in like man-
ner an adequate rule of law to aid industry and finance can
be obtained under the Connecticut rule. It should be the
majority view.
61. Final Accounting of Kernochan & another Exc., 104 N.Y. 618,
11 N.E. 149 (1887).

